CryptanalysisBench – Can LLMs do Cryptanalysis?

Abstract

Cryptanalysis—the task of finding attacks against cryptographic schemes—sits at the intersection of mathematical reasoning and programming, two areas where LLMs have made rapid progress. Just like math and programming, cryptanalytic attacks are formally defined and can be unambiguously verified. This raises the question if cryptanalysis might experience a similar acceleration in progress through LLMs. In this paper we introduce CryptanalysisBench, a benchmark of 114 tasks spanning six families of cryptographic primitives (block ciphers, hash functions, etc) drawn primarily from four NIST standardization competitions. Each task asks an agent to break an implementation of a cryptographic primitive by winning a formal security game. The benchmark has three tiers: (1) primitives with known practical breaks; (2) scaled-down variants of primitives without one; (3) a challenge set of unbroken production primitives. We evaluate Claude Opus 4.7, GPT-5.5 and Claude Mythos: all three solve a majority of Tier 1 (72.4%, 79.3%, and 75.9% respectively), while Tier 2 remains largely out of reach. One notable exception in Tier 2 is the SPoC AEAD, for which Mythos proposed a novel full key recovery attack. For Tier 1 successes, we provide a fine-grained analysis distinguishing paper recall from source-level rediscovery. We release CryptanalysisBench both as a forecasting tool to track when AI cryptanalytic capability becomes a serious factor, and as scaffolding for subjecting candidate schemes to more attacks before they are deployed.



Bio

Prof. Orr Dunkelman is a full professor at the Computer Science Dept. in the University of Haifa and a Guest Professor at the Technical University of Berlin. His research interests cover cryptography, with emphasis on cryptanalysis, privacy, with emphasis on biometric data, and computer security. He has served as the head of the Sub-center for Biometrics and its Applications here at the Center for Cyber, Law and Policy, and is a co-founder of the center (and was the center’s vice-director). He served on the board of the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR), as a delegate to the ISO/IEC SC27 WG2 and WG3 (as an expert in cryptography and computer security), and he is a co-founder of the “Privacy Israel” NGO. Currently he serves as the chair of the Fast Software Encryption steering committee.

During his academic career, Prof. Dunkelman published more than 130 papers in international venues, including the introduction of new cryptanalytic techniques and best known cryptanalysis results against specific ciphers (such as the AES). As part of his analysis work, he is also a co-designer of multiple cryptographic schemes such as the HAIFA framework for hash functions, the KATAN and KTANTAN block ciphers, and the SHAvite-3 hash function. He served on almost 100 program committees (including EUROCRYPT, CRYPTO, ASIACRYPT, and Usenix), and as a program chair of 6 conferences (including EUROCRYPT 2022 and FSE 2009). He won numerous awards such as the Krill prize (2014) and Best Paper Awards (e.g., Crypto 2012 and FSE 2012).



Photo provided by speaker

Bachelor@ISEC & Awards 2026

At the event, we present our new open bachelor’s thesis (and master’s thesis) topics and award prizes to excellent students.  

If you’re interested in joining us for your bachelor’s thesis in security, this is the best way to get an impression of our topics as well as how a bachelor’s thesis at ISEC works: You’ll hear about our research areas and current hot topics, our Bachelor@ISEC program where you can work on your thesis together with your fellow students in one of our offices if you like, and maybe you’ll get to know your supervisor while chatting along.

The event will also be the kick-off lecture in Introduction to Scientific Working (ISW), where you will be able to choose your preferred topic!   

We are looking forward to meeting you!


THE AWARDS:

ISEC Student Research Excellence Award: Students at ISEC who became co-authors of a scientific publication in the context of a thesis or project receive this award.

ISEC Bachelor Excellence Award: This award is for students majoring in “Information Security” at TU Graz and have completed their bachelor’s degree with distinction at TU Graz. Application deadline: Oct 7th 2026!


 

‼️We are aware of the conflict with the Design and Analysis of Algorithms (DAA) exercise. If your DAA exercise group overlaps with Bachelor@ISEC, you may attend a different exercise group that day. Please inform the DAA exercise team in advance!


📷 Please be aware that we will be taking photos & videos at this event. Find the privacy policy here.
If you do not want to be photographed, please approach one of the organizers at the event.

Master@ISEC 2026

We’ll give an overview of the Major in Information Security and all you need to know about it (including our Master@ISEC network and its benefits), and provide an opportunity to meet fellow students and lecturers while enjoying some snacks.

No matter if you just started or are heading to the end of your studies, anyone interested is welcome! 


📷 Please be aware that we will be taking photos & videos at this event. Find the privacy policy here.
If you do not want to be photographed, please approach one of the organizers at the event.

Clash of the Titans: The Co-Evolution of AI and Cryptography


Abstract

Artificial intelligence is rapidly changing how we analyze, attack, and protect cryptographic systems. After initially being treated with considerable skepticism, AI-based techniques now achieve state-of-the-art results across several areas of cryptographic and hardware security. Neural networks have transformed profiled side-channel analysis, improved the modeling and evaluation of physically unclonable functions, supported the detection of hardware Trojans and implementation weaknesses, and assisted increasingly sophisticated forms of cryptanalysis. At the same time, the growing use of AI introduces new security challenges. AI models are often difficult to interpret, reproduce, and validate, while their behavior can be manipulated through adversarial examples, poisoned training data, backdoors, model extraction, and other attacks. These concerns become even more important as large language models and autonomous AI systems are deployed in security-critical environments. This talk explores the bidirectional relationship between AI and cryptography. First, we will examine examples in which machine learning has improved cryptanalysis and hardware-security evaluation, as well as the methodological limitations that can make such results unreliable or misleading. We will then reverse the perspective and investigate how cryptographic concepts and techniques can contribute to protecting AI systems. Topics will include cryptanalysis-inspired model extraction, cryptographically indistinguishable backdoors, secure distributed learning, and mechanisms for verifying computations and model behavior. The talk will conclude by outlining open challenges at the intersection of these fields. Rather than viewing AI and cryptography as separate disciplines, the talk argues that their interaction is becoming a central part of the future security landscape.

Bio

Stjepan Picek is a full professor at the University of Zagreb, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing, Croatia. He also holds an associate professor position at Radboud University, Nijmegen, and an adjunct professor position at the University of Bergen, Norway.

Before that, he was an assistant professor at TU Delft and a postdoctoral researcher at MIT, USA, and KU Leuven, Belgium. Stjepan completed PhD in computer science in 2015 at the University of Zagreb, Croatia and Radboud University, The Netherlands. In 2024, he finished a PhD in mathematics at the University of Paris 8, France. His research interests include security and cryptography, machine learning, and evolutionary computation.
To date, Stjepan has given more than 80 invited talks and published more than 200 refereed papers. He is a program committee member and reviewer for a number of conferences and journals and a member of several professional societies. His work has been featured in the mainstream media and on popular technology blogs. He is a member of ELLIS and a Fellow of the Young Academy of Europe.

Photo provided by speaker

Pentesting Lab Guest Lecture

>> Pentesting Lab course <<

Abstract

Generative AI, and especially LLMs, are being touted as the be-all-end-all for the future of any programming related task. Of course, the people making these claims usually have a financial interest in everyone replacing workers and experts with artificial “intelligence”.

Based on experience in machine learning (ML) research, as well as by now multiple years of penetration testing experience, Alex will talk about the actual everyday impact that LLMs have on our security work.
What we see is not the replacement of knowledgable security workers, but merely another tool in our toolbox. Let’s talk about how LLMs are utilized in our day-to-day work to help us speed up testing, which tasks can be handled by LLMs, and where human expertise, oversight, and communication skills will likely never be replaced.


Bio
Alex has studied Computer Science at the University of Innsbruck in the Bachelor’s and Master’s focussing on security related topics and machine learning (ML) topics and courses where available.
After finishing the undergraduate studies, he worked as a graduate researcher for four years, publishing a number of papers in the realm of adversarial ML and ML security.
For the past years he has been working as a penetration tester, and in this time has successfully pwned various web servers, mobile applications, and even certificate authorities.



Photo provided by speaker

An Attack So Effective, you can Teach it to Undergrads: The Story of the Targeted Deanonymization Side Channel Attack

What is the targeted deanonymization side-channel attack? Why hasn’t it been fixed yet? Will somebody volunteer for the live demo? 

Abstract
They are remotely programmable, they are installed on every computer and every phone, and they process a huge amount of extremely sensitive information. This combination makes web browsers a permanent target for attackers in general, and for side-channel analysts in particular.

This talk will survey one such attack, targeted deanonymization. I will explain the attack, talk about its evolution from desktop to mobile to classroom, discuss defenses against the attack, and try to understand, together with the audience, why it still exists four years after it was disclosed to Google. If a suitable volunteer is found, the talk will also include a live demo on one of the attendees’ personal devices.

Joint work with Tapan Basak, Robert Blacha, Mojtaba Zaheri, Reza Curtmola and Hai Phan.



Bio
Prof. Yossi Oren is an Associate Professor in the Institute for Software, Systems and Security (S³) at the Stein Faculty of Computer and Information Science at Ben Gurion University of the Negev, and a member of BGU’s Cyber Security Research Center. Prior to joining BGU, Yossi was a Post-Doctoral Research Scientist in the Network Security Lab at Columbia University in the City of New York and a member of the security lab at Samsung Research Israel. He holds a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from Tel-Aviv University (thesis), and an M.Sc. in Computer Science from the Weizmann Institute of Science (thesis).

His research interests include implementation security (side-channel attacks, micro-architectural attacks, power analysis and other hardware attacks and countermeasures; low-resource cryptographic constructions for lightweight computers) and cryptography in the real world (consumer and voter privacy in the digital era; web application security). He has been recognized by The Register as a Top Boffin.



Photo provided by speaker

FMCAD’26

We’re hosting FMCAD 2026 (Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design), an annual conference on the theory and applications of formal methods in hardware and system verification. 

FMCAD provides a leading forum to researchers in academia and industry for presenting and discussing groundbreaking methods, technologies, theoretical results, and tools for reasoning formally about computing systems. FMCAD covers formal aspects of computer-aided system design including verification, specification, synthesis, and testing. 

Continuing the tradition of the previous years, FMCAD 2026 is hosting a Student Forum that provides a platform for students at any career stage (undergraduate or graduate) to introduce their research to the wider Formal Methods community and solicit feedback.

Student forum abstract submission: June 16, 2026

Mobile Security

Is standardization fast enough to cope with modern attack vectors? 🤨

Mobile Networks have security built in starting with 2G. This lecture gives an introduction to mobile networks and which security measures are in place. It’s your opportunity to ask anything you’ve ever wanted to know about mobile networks!



Bio

Georg Löffelmann is the Head of Department Mobile at A1 Telekom and has 25+ years of experience in the telecoms industry, of which 15+ years are in leading large teams with both strategic and operational focus.

As a member of A1 Group, he successfully delivered on large international projects and trusts in a large network of both national and international colleagues and industry partners. He has a deep technical know-how regarding mobile network technologies 2G-6G as well as NFV, SDN,(XG)PON, HFC, DSL, SDH, WDM, IP and MPLS.



Photo © Sabine Hauswirth  

Formal Verification of Neural Networks: Guarantees Beyond Testing

Abstract

Neural networks are increasingly deployed in safety-critical domains, where failures can have severe consequences. However, standard evaluation based on testing and validation datasets cannot provide formal guarantees about model behavior under all possible inputs. This talk introduces neural network verification, focusing on methods that provide provable guarantees of safety and robustness. We present the problem as checking whether a model satisfies a given property over a set of inputs, such as robustness to bounded perturbations or compliance with safety constraints. We then survey key approaches, including exact methods based on mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) and SMT solving, as well as more scalable but approximate techniques based on over-approximation and bound propagation. Simple examples illustrate how these methods work and highlight the trade-off between precision and scalability. The talk concludes with a brief overview of current limitations and emerging research directions, including certified robustness and integration with training procedures.



Bio

Laura Nenzi is an Associate Professor in Computer Science at the University of Trieste. Her research lies in formal methods for complex systems, with a focus on runtime verification,spatio-temporal logics, and the formal analysis of cyber-physical systems. She is also interested in verified and explainable artificial intelligence, aiming to provide rigorous guarantees for modern data-driven models.



Photo provided by speaker

Past the Perimeter: Low-Cost Memory Interposer Attacks on Confidential Computing

Abstract

As cloud computing adoption grows, so do concerns about trust and data privacy. Confidential computing, powered by innovative hardware technologies like Intel SGX and AMD SEV, promises strong isolation and transparent memory encryption to protect against privileged attackers and physical threats such as bus snooping and cold boot attacks.

This talk overviews our recent work on BadRAM and BatteringRAM, showing that state-of-the-art memory encryption can be reliably bypassed with limited physical access and ~$50 of custom hardware. By introducing a novel form of runtime memory aliasing, we defeat even the firmware defenses deployed in response to our earlier findings; ultimately exposing fundamental limitations in today’s scalable confidential computing designs.



Bio

Jo Van Bulck is a professor in the DistriNet lab at the Department of Computer Science of KU Leuven, Belgium. His research explores attacks and defenses at the hardware-software boundary, with particular attention to privileged side channels in trusted execution environments.

Jo’s research has uncovered several innovative attack vectors in commodity Intel x86 processors that have led to microcode and silicon mitigations in hardware, as well as software patches in major operating systems and compilers.



Photo provided by speaker